[MR. ALDERMAN continues]
MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, an hour later, following the
conversation between Goering and
Seyss-Inquart, with which I dealt this morning, the defendant Goering
telephoned to Dombrowski in the German Embassy in Vienna.
I refer to the telephone conversation marked TT on page 2, Part C, of
document 2949-PS. In that conversation, in the first
place, the defendant Goering showed concern that the Nazi Party and all
of its organisations should be definitely legalised
promptly. I quote from page 2 of the transcript:
"Goering: Now to go on,
the Party has
Dombrowski calls attention to the fact that the SA and SS
have already been on duty for half ail hour, which means everything is
Dombrowski: But that is ... it isn't necessary to even discuss that.
Goering: With all of its organisations.
Dombrowski: With all of its organisations within this country.
Goering: In uniform?
Dombrowski: In uniform.
In addition Goering stated that the
Cabinet, the Austrian Cabinet, must be formed by 7.30 p.m., and he
transmitted instructions to be delivered to Seyss-Inquart as
to who should be appointed to the Cabinet. I quote from page 3 of the
English text of the transcript of the conversation:
"Goering: Yes, and by 7.30
must talk with the
Fuehrer, and as to the Cabinet, Keppler will bring you the
names. One thing I have forgotten. Fishbock must have the Department of
Economy and Commerce.
Dombrowski: That is
Goering: Kaltenbrunner is to have the Department of Security, and Bahr
is to have the Armed Forces. The
Austrian Army is to be taken by Seyss-Inquart, and you know all about
the Justice Department.
Dombrowski: Yes, yes.
Goering: Give me the name.
Dombrowski: Well, your brother-in-law, isn't that right?"
(That is, Subert, the brother-in-law of the defendant Goering.)
Goering: That's right, and then also Fishbock."
And about twenty minutes
later, at 5.26 p.m., Goering was given the news that Miklas, the
President, was refusing to appoint Seyss-Inquart as
Chancellor, and he issued instructions as to the ultimatum that was to
be delivered to Miklas. I quote from the telephone
conversation between Goering and Seyss-Inquart, in Part E of the
folder, the part marked with capital R, pages 1 and 2 of Part
E. I'm sorry, I thought the interpreters had the letter marked. They
have not, I understand.
"Goering: Now remember
the following: You go immediately together with Lt.-General Muff and
tell the Federal President that if the conditions which are
known to you are not accepted immediately, the troops who are already
stationed at and advancing to the frontier will march in
to-night along the whole line, and Austria will cease to exist.
Lt.-General Muff should go with you and demand to be admitted
for conference immediately. Please do inform us immediately about
Miklas' position. Tell him there is no time now for any joke.
Just through the false report we received before, action was delayed,
but now the situation is that to-night the invasion will
begin from all the corners of Austria. The invasion will be stopped,
and the troops will be field at the border, only if we are
informed by 7.30 that Miklas has entrusted you with the Federal
Chancellorship." There follows in the transcript a sentence
which is broken up. "M," - I suppose that means Lt. General Muff -
"does not matter whatever it might be, the immediate
restoration of the Party with all its organisations." There is again an
interruption in the transcript. "And then call out all
the National Socialists all over the country. They should now be in the
streets; so remember report must be given by 7.30.
Lt.-General Muff is supposed to come along with you. I shall inform him
immediately. If Miklas could not understand it in four
hours, we shall make him understand it now in four minutes."
An hour later, at 6.20 p.m., Goering had an
extensively interrupted telephone conversation with Keppler and Muff
and Seyss-Inquart. When he told Keppler that Miklas had
refused to appoint Seyss-Inquart, Goering said - I read from Part H -
it is about a third of the way down on the page.
"Goering: Well, then
to dismiss him.
Just go upstairs again and just tell him plainly that
Seyss-Inquart (S.I.) shall call on the National-Socialists guard, and
in five minutes the troops will march in by my
After an interruption, Seyss-Inquart came to the telephone and informed
the defendant Goering that Miklas
was still sticking to his old view, although a new person had gone in
to talk to him, and there might be definite word in about
ten minutes. The conversation proceeded as follows: I quote from page 2
of Part H, beginning about the middle of the page:
"Goering: Listen, I shall
wait a few
more minutes, till he
comes back; then you inform me via Blitz conversation in
the Reich Chancellery as usually, but it has to be done fast. I hardly
can justify it as a matter of fact. I am not entitled to
do so; if it can not be done, then you have to take over the power, all
In other words, Goering and Seyss-Inquart had agreed on a plan for
Seyss-Inquart to take over power if Miklas
remained obdurate. The plan which was already discussed involved the
use of both the National Socialist forces in Austria and
the German troops who bad been crossing the borders. Later that night
Goering and Seyss-Inquart had another conversation at
about 11 o'clock. This was after the ultimatum had expired.
Seyss-Inquart informed Goering that Miklas was still refusing to
name Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. The conversation then proceeded as
follows, and I quote from Part 1 of this folder:
Seyss-Inquart: But if he threatens?
Seyss-Inquart: Well, I see; then we shall be ready.
Goering: Call me via Blitz."
THE PRESIDENT: What's the German word for O.K.?
MR. ALDERMAN: Schon.
shall give the order to march in and then you make sure
you get the power. Notify the leading people about the following which
I shall tell you now:
Everyone who offers resistance or organises resistance will immediately
be subjected to our court-martial, the court-martial of
our invading troops. Is that clear?
Goering: Including leading personalities; it does not
make any difference.
Seyss-Inquart: Yes, they have given the order not to offer any
Yes, it does not matter; the Federal President did not authorise you
and that also can be considered as resistance.
Goering: Well, now you are officially authorised.
Goering: Well, good luck, Heil Hitler."
I'm sorry; that conversation took place at 8 o'clock not 11. I meant
to say 8 o'clock. It is quite interesting to me that when the defendant
Goering was planning to invade a peaceful neighbouring
State, he planned to try those whom he referred to as major war
criminals, the leading personalities, before a German
court-martial. So much for the conversation with respect to the plan of
action for taking over power. Then something very
significant was sent on that subject over the telephone, at least so
far as those transcripts indicate. But there was another
historical event which was discussed over the telephone. I refer to the
famous telegram which Seyss-Inquart sent to the German
Government, requesting the German Government to send troops into
Austria to help Seyss-Inquart put down disorder. A
conversation held at 8.48 that night between Goering and Keppler
proceeded as follows: I read from page 1 of Part L:
"Goering: Well, I do not
Listen, the main thing
is that if Inquart takes over all powers of government he
keeps the radio stations occupied.
Keppler: Well, we represent the Government now.
Goering: Yes, that's it. You
are the Government. Listen carefully. The following telegram should be
sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Take the notes: "The
provisional Austrian Government which, after the dismissal of the
Schuschnigg Government, considered it its task to establish
police and order in Austria, send to the German Government the urgent
request to support it in its task to help it to prevent
bloodshed. For this purpose, it asks the German Government to send
German troops as soon as possible."
Well, SA and SS are marching through the streets, but everything is
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say
MR. ALDERMAN: Quiet.
THE PRESIDENT: In my copy, it is "quick."
MR. ALDERMAN: That is a
typographical error. It is "Quiet."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
collapsed with the professional groups. Now let us talk about sending
German troops to put down disorder."
and the SS were marching in the streets, but everything was quiet. And
a few minutes later, the conversation continued thus,
reading from page 2 of Part L:
Goering: Then our troops
will cross the
Good, he should send the telegram as soon as possible.
Keppler: Well, send the telegram to Seyss-Inquart in the office
of the Federal Chancellor.
Goering: Please show him the text of the telegram and do tell him that
we are asking him -
well, he doesn't even need to send the telegram. All he needs to do is
to say, 'Agreed.'
Goering: He doesn't know me at the Fuehrer's or at my place. Well, good
luck. Heil Hitler."
course, he didn't need to send the telegram because Goering wrote the
telegram. He already had it. It must be recalled that in
the first conversation, Part A, held at 3.5 p.m., Goering had requested
Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram agreed upon, but now
the matter was so urgent that he discussed the direct wording of the
telegram over the telephone. And an hour later, at 9.54
p.m. a conversation between Dr. Dietrich in Berlin and Keppler in
Vienna went on as follows, reading from Part M:
"Dietrich: I need the
Keppler: Tell the General Field Marshal that Seyss-Inquart agrees.
Dietrich: This is marvellous. Thank you.
Keppler: Listen to the radio. News will be given.
Keppler: From Vienna.
Dietrich: So Seyss-Inquart agrees?
Next the actual order to invade Austria. Communications in Austria were
now suspended but the German military
machine had been set in motion. To demonstrate that, I now offer in
evidence captured document C-182, offered as exhibit USA 77,
a directive of 11th March, 1938, at 2045 hours, from Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces. This directive, initialled by
General Jodl and signed by Hitler, orders the invasion of Austria in
view of its failure to comply with the German ultimatum.
The directive reads:
"Top secret. Berlin, 11th
March, 1938, 2045
Commander of the Armed Forces,
OKW," with symbols. 35 copies, 6th copy. C-in-C. Navy (pencil note) has
been informed. Re: Operation Otto. Directive No. 2.
(1) The demands of the German ultimatum to the Austrian Government have
not been fulfilled.
(2) The Austrian
Armed Forces have been ordered to withdraw in front of the entry of
German troops and to avoid fighting.
Austrian Government has ceased to function of its own accord.
(3) To avoid further bloodshed in Austrian towns, the
entry of the German Armed Forces into Austria will commence, according
to directive No. 1, at day-break on 12.3.
expect the set objectives to be reached by exerting all forces to the
full as quickly as possible. Signed Adolf Hitler.
Initialled by Jodl and by a name that looks like Warlimont."
And then some interesting communications with
Rome, to avoid possibility of disaster from that quarter. At the very
time that Hitler and Goering had embarked on this military
undertaking they still had a question mark in. their minds, and that
was Italy. Italy had massed on the Italian border in 1934
on the occasion of 25th July, 1934, the putsch, Italy had traditionally
been the political protector of Austria.
a sigh of relief did Hitler hear at 10.25 p.m. that night from Prince
Phillipp von Hessen, his Ambassador at Rome, that he had
just come back from the Palazzo Venezia, where Mussolini had accepted
the whole thing in a very friendly manner. The situation
can really be grasped by the reading of the conversation. The record of
the conversation shows the excitement under which Hitler
was operating when he spoke over the phone. It is a short conversation,
and I shall read the first half of it from Part "N" of
the transcript of document 2949-PS. I'm afraid Part "N" may be blurred
on the mimeographed copy. "H" is Hessen and "F" is the
"Hessen: I have just come
Palazzo Venezia. The
Duce accepted the whole thing in a very
friendly manner. He sends you his regards. He had been informed from
Austria, von Schuschnigg gave him the news. He had then said it would
be a complete impossibility; it would be a bluff; such a
thing could not be done. So
he was told that it was unfortunately arranged thus, and it could not
be changed any more. Then Mussolini said that Austria
would be immaterial to him."
The Tribunal will recall the reference in Jodl's diary to the letter
Hitler had sent to Mussolini. It is dated 11th March. It may be found
in the official publication "Dokumente der Deutschen
Politik," Volume 6, 1, page 135, number 24A. I ask the Court to take
judicial notice of it and you will find a translation of it
appearing in our document 2510-PS. In this letter, after stating that
Austria had been declining into anarchy, Hitler wrote -
and I quote:
Hitler: Then please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for this.
Hitler: Never, never, never, whatever happens. I am still ready to make
a quite different agreement with him.
Hessen: Yes, I told him that, too.
Hitler: As soon as the Austrian affair has been settled, I shall be
go with him through thick and thin; nothing matters.
Hessen: Yes, my Fuehrer.
Hitler: Listen, I shall
make any agreement - I am no longer in fear of the terrible position
which would have existed militarily in case we had become
involved in a conflict. You may tell him that I do thank him ever so
much, never, never shall I forget that.
Yes, my Fuehrer.
Hitler: I will never forget it, whatever will happen. If he should ever
need any help or be in any
danger, he can be convinced that I shall stick to him whatever might
happen, even if the whole world were against him.
Hessen: Yes, my Fuehrer."
"I have decided to
in my fatherland -
order and tranquillity - and to give to the
popular will the possibility of settling its own faith in unmistakable
fashion openly and by its own decision."
He stated that this was an act of self-defence; that he had no hostile
intentions towards Italy. And after the invasion, when
Hitler was at Linz, Austria, he communicated his gratitude to Mussolini
once more, in the famous telegram which the world so
well remembers. I again cite Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 6,
page 145, number 29, the translation of the telegram
being in our document 2467-PS, and the document reads:
"Mussolini, I shall never forget you for this."